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Roe, Casey, and Sex-Selection Abortion
Bans
Thomas J. Molony*
Abstract
Forty years after Roe v. Wade, state legislatures continue to
try to chip away at a woman’s right to choose. In a flurry of recent
activity, lawmakers across the country have considered and, in
some cases, adopted sweeping measures that range from expanded
clinic-safety regulations to outright bans on abortion early in
pregnancy if a fetal heartbeat can be detected. Several states have
banned sex-selection abortions—abortions sought based on the sex
of the fetus. These narrow bans advance society’s interest in
eradicating sex discrimination, an interest the Supreme Court has
not considered in the abortion context but elsewhere has described
as compelling. Sex-selection abortion bans, therefore, test in a new
way the limits of state regulation.
To survive constitutional challenge, a sex-selection abortion
ban must satisfy the requirements established in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. Casey, while
retaining Roe’s “central holding” that a woman has the right to
choose abortion before the fetus is viable, fundamentally changed
the constitutional landscape by granting states greater latitude to
regulate abortion pre-viability. Under Casey, states may adopt
reasonable pre-viability regulations that do not impose an undue
burden on the woman’s right and may restrict abortion postviability so long as exceptions apply when the procedure is
necessary to protect the life or health of the woman.
Recent federal court decisions suggest that Casey leaves no
room for a pre-viability ban of any sort. Under these precedents,
sex-selection abortion bans, which typically apply throughout
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pregnancy, would seem destined to fail. A careful reading of Roe
and Casey, however, reveals a less certain destiny. While
recognizing the barriers Casey presents for sex-selection abortion
bans, this Article offers an argument as to how a narrowly drafted
ban might survive a challenge under Casey. The Article also
evaluates the bans currently in place or that have been proposed
and
offers
suggestions
for
improvement,
including
recommendations as to how the bans might be modified to fit more
safely within the parameters the Court has established.
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I. Introduction
Forty years have passed since the United States Supreme
Court decided Roe v. Wade,1 and lawmakers across the country
continue to adopt legislation to rein in a woman’s right to choose.
Legislative efforts have accelerated recently,2 with states such as
Texas, North Dakota, Kansas, and North Carolina adopting new
abortion laws in the face of strong opposition by pro-choice
advocates.3 The measures adopted in North Dakota, Kansas, and
North Carolina include bans on sex-selection abortions—
abortions sought because of the sex of the fetus.4 Because these
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. See Chris Good, Starting This Week, It’s Harder to Get an Abortion in 5
States, ABC NEWS (July 2, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/
2013/07/starting-this-week-its-harder-to-get-an-abortion-in-5-states/ (last visited
Feb. 5, 2014) (“Abortion restrictions are popping up everywhere, it seems.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See Juliet Eilperin, N.C. Gov. McCrory Signs Anti-Abortion Bill into
Law Monday Night, WASH. POST (July 29, 2013, 10:38 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/07/29/nc-govmccrory-signs-anti-abortion-bill-into-law-monday-night/ (last visited Dec. 29,
2013) (indicating that North Carolina’s governor signed a 2013 abortion law, “as
abortion rights protestors waged a 12-hour vigil across the street from his
executive mansion”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); John
Eligon & Erik Eckholm, New Laws Ban Most Abortions in North Dakota, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/us/north-dakotagovernor-signs-strict-abortion-limits.htmp?pagewanted=all (last visited Dec. 29,
2013) (indicating that pro-choice advocates “quickly condemned” a 2013 North
Dakota abortion law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Manny
Fernandez, Abortion Restrictions Become Law in Texas, but Opponents Will
Press Fight, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/
us/perry-signs-texas-abortion-restrictions-into-law.html?_r=0 (last visited Dec.
29, 2013) (noting substantial opposition to a 2013 Texas law banning abortions
after twenty weeks gestation and modifying standards for abortion clinics) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); John Hanna, Sweeping AntiAbortion Bill Passes Kansas Legislature, Awaits Governor’s Signature, KAN.
CITY STAR (Apr. 6, 2013), http://www.kansascity.com/2013/04/06/4165019
/sweeping-anti-abortion-bill-passes.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2013) (noting the
positions taken by abortion foes and abortion rights advocates with respect to a
2013 Kansas abortion law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See H.B. 2253, 2013 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. § 10(a) (Kan. 2013) (“No
person shall perform or induce an abortion . . . with knowledge that the
pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the
[fetus].”); S.B. 353, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. § 90-21.121(a) (N.C. 2013)
(“[No] person shall perform or attempt to perform an abortion upon a woman in
this State with knowledge . . . that a significant factor in the woman seeking the
abortion is related to the sex of the [fetus].”); H.B. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg.
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narrow bans attempt to control access to abortion based on a
woman’s reasons for having the procedure, they challenge the
constitutional limits of abortion regulation in a new way.
The Court in Roe rejected the notion that a woman has the
right to choose to have an abortion “at whatever time, in
whatever way, and for whatever reason that she alone chooses.”5
In Roe and later in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,6 the Court addressed limitations on
timing,7 and in Gonzales v. Carhart,8 the Court dealt with
constraints on manner.9 The Court, however, never has squarely
faced the question of a state’s ability to limit abortion based on
the reasons for which it is sought. Sex-selection abortion bans
present this very question.
It is common to think of Roe as the constitutional norm for
abortion regulations and restrictions, but Casey sets the current
standard. Therefore, it is Casey that a sex-selection abortion ban
must satisfy to be constitutional. While the Court in Casey
retained the “most central principle of Roe” that a woman has the
“right to terminate her pregnancy before viability,”10 it gave
Sess. § 2(1) (N.D. 2013) (“[A] physician may not intentionally perform or attempt
to perform an abortion with knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the
abortion solely on account of the sex of the [fetus] . . . .”). The bans adopted in
North Dakota, Kansas, and North Carolina, as well as some of those that have
been adopted or proposed in other states, apply to any “unborn child,” a term
that would include not only a fetus but also a human in an earlier stage of
development. See H.B. 2253, 2013 Leg., 2013-14 Sess. §§ 1, 10 (Kan. 2013)
(defining and using the term “unborn child”); H.B. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. §§ 1, 2 (N.D. 2013) (same); S.B. 353, Gen. Assemb., 2013-14 Reg. Sess.
§ 3(a) (N.C. 2013) (using the term “unborn child”); H.B. 386, 97th Gen. Assemb.,
1st Reg. Sess. § A (Mo. 2013) (defining and using the term “unborn child”).
Nevertheless, the term “fetus” is used throughout this Article when describing
sex-selection abortion bans.
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
6. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
7. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 160, 165 (setting viability as the time at which a
state may prohibit abortion entirely so long as exceptions are made for
protection of the life or health of the woman); Casey, 505 U.S. at 871, 879
(stating that “[t]he woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is
the most central principle of Roe v. Wade . . . and [is] a component of liberty”).
8. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
9. See id. at 132, 156 (holding that a federal ban on partial-birth abortion
did not violate the Constitution).
10. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871.
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states substantially more latitude to adopt abortion laws than
they had under Roe. In Casey, the Court preserved the ability of
states under Roe to “regulate, and even proscribe, abortion [after
viability] except where it is necessary . . . for the preservation of
the life or health of the mother”11 and opened a new door to previability measures that do not pose an “undue burden” on a
woman’s right to abort a non-viable fetus.12
Despite the door that Casey opened, the prospects for sexselection abortion bans seem rather grim. Though otherwise
narrow, sex-selection abortion bans typically apply throughout
pregnancy,13 and recent federal court decisions call into question
whether Casey permits a pre-viability ban of any kind.14 Unlike
the bans considered in these recent cases, however, sex-selection
abortion bans serve a state interest that was not considered in
Roe or Casey—that of eliminating sex discrimination and its
harmful effects. The presence of this interest, which the Court
has described as “compelling” in cases involving freedom of
association for expressive purposes,15 makes the answer to the
question of the constitutionality of sex-selection abortion bans
less clear than it might first appear.
This Article considers whether a sex-selection abortion ban
can, and how it might, be upheld under Casey. Part II begins by
describing the various forms of sex-selection bans that have been
adopted or considered by various state legislatures and in the
U.S. Congress. Part III follows with a general discussion of Roe
and how Casey, through its undue burden standard, altered the
11. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. at 879
(quoting Roe).
12. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876–77
(1992) (describing the undue burden test).
13. See infra note 49 and accompanying text (noting that only the ban
proposed in Oregon does not apply throughout pregnancy).
14. See infra notes 57–99 and accompanying text (discussing recent federal
cases striking down abortion bans).
15. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537,
549 (1987) (citing a state’s “compelling interest in eliminating discrimination
against women” to uphold a state public accommodation law against the
argument that it unconstitutionally infringed Rotary members’ right of
expressive association); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)
(finding the State’s compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against
women justified an infringement on an organization’s freedom of association).
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framework Roe had established for evaluating abortion laws. In
Part IV, the Article examines whether the most narrowly drawn
sex-selection abortion ban can survive Casey. It explains that
such a ban is constitutional post-viability even without an explicit
life or health exception. After acknowledging the difficulty in
arguing that such a ban is constitutional pre-viability, Part IV
attempts to lay out a reasonable argument in support of a very
narrow pre-viability sex-selection abortion ban. To make the
argument, the Article examines the Court’s treatment of the
parental consent provisions of the Pennsylvania statute at issue
in Casey and draws on Court decisions recognizing that a state’s
compelling interest in eliminating sex-discrimination justifies a
slight infringement on the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
expressive association. This same interest, Part IV posits, also
may be sufficient to sanction the slight infringement that a
narrow sex-selection abortion ban may impose on a woman’s right
to choose. Part V considers the future of sex-selection abortion
bans, how states might make their bans more effective, and what
states might do to improve their prospects of surviving Casey.
The Article concludes that sex-selection abortion bans primarily
serve not as a practical barrier to abortion, but as a vehicle—and
an important one—for a state to emphasize the equal dignity that
women and men share, and in light of that reality, states should
draft their bans carefully so that they can deliver this important
message as powerfully as possible.
II. Sex-Selection Abortion Bans
Although sex-selection abortion bans have received quite a
bit of attention lately, they are not new. For over twenty years,
Illinois and Pennsylvania have prohibited abortion when it is
sought solely based on the sex of the fetus.16 New bans, however,
have started to appear in greater numbers in the past few years.
Since 2010, five additional states—Arizona, Kansas, North
16. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 510/6(8) (1984) (“No person shall
intentionally perform an abortion with the knowledge that the pregnant woman
is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the fetus.”); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3204(c) (West 1989) (“No abortion which is sought solely because of
the sex of the [fetus] shall be deemed a necessary abortion.”).
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Carolina, North Dakota, and Oklahoma—have enacted sexselection abortion bans.17 In addition, bills proposing sex-selection
abortion bans have been introduced recently in eleven other state
legislatures and in Congress.18
17. See H.B. 2253, 2013 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. § 10(a) (Kan. 2013)
(prohibiting a person from “perform[ing] or induc[ing] an abortion . . . with
knowledge that the pregnant women is seeking the abortion solely on account of
the sex of the [fetus]”); S.B. 353, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 9021.121(a) (N.C. 2013) (providing that no one shall perform an abortion “with
knowledge, or an objective reason to know, that a significant factor in the
woman seeking the abortion is related to the sex of the [fetus]”); H.B. 1305, 63d
Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1(a) (N.D. 2013) (barring any physician from
“intentionally perform[ing] or attempt[ing] to perform an abortion with
knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely on account of
the sex of the [fetus]”); H.B. 2443, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 13-3603.02(A)(1)
(Ariz. 2011) (proscribing the act of “perform[ing] an abortion knowing that the
abortion is sought based on the sex or race of the child”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63
§ 1-731.2(B) (West 2010) (“No person shall knowingly or recklessly perform or
attempt to perform an abortion with knowledge that the pregnant female is
seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the [fetus].”).
18. See Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2013, H.R. 447,
113th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (2013) (establishing criminal and civil liability for
“knowingly perform[ing] an abortion knowing that such abortion is sought based
on the sex, gender, color or race of the [fetus]”); H.B. 1131, 69th Gen. Assemb.,
1st Reg. Sess. § 18-3.5-203(1) (Colo. 2013) (prohibiting a person from knowingly
performing a sex-selection abortion, using force to coerce a sex-selection
abortion, soliciting or accepting money to perform such abortion, or transporting
a woman to obtain such a procedure); S.B. 56, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess.
§ 18-3.5-203(1) (Colo. 2013) (same); H.B. 845, 115th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(6)(a)
(Fla. 2013) (“A person may not knowingly . . . perform, induce, or actively
participate in a termination of a pregnancy knowing that it is sought based on
the sex or race of the [fetus]”); S.B. 1072, 115th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(6)(a) (Fla.
2013) (same); H.B. 1430, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 3 (Ind. 2013)
(prohibiting the intentional performance of an abortion before and after viability
“if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking a sex-selective
abortion”); S.B. 183, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 4 (Ind. 2013) (same);
H.B. 386, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 188.281(1) (Mo. 2013) (“No person
shall intentionally perform . . . an abortion with the knowledge that the
pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the
[fetus].”); S.B. 2286, 236th Leg. Sess., 2013–14 Reg. Sess. § 230-e(2) (N.Y. 2013)
(“No person shall knowingly or recklessly perform or attempt to perform an
abortion with knowledge that the pregnant female is seeking the abortion solely
on account of the sex of the [fetus].”); H.B. 3515, 77th Leg. Assemb., 2013 Reg.
Sess. § 1(2) (Or. 2013) (barring the performance of “late-term sex-selection
abortion[s],” defined as sex-selection abortions performed during the third
trimester of the pregnancy); H.B. 17, 83d Leg., 2d Sess. § 170.003(a) (Tex. 2013)
(prohibiting a person from “knowingly perform[ing] or attempt[ing] to
perform . . . an abortion that is based on the sex of the pregnant woman’s
[fetus]” as well as the use or threat of force to intentionally coerce such a
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By and large, the sex-selection abortion bans that have been
adopted or proposed are very narrowly drawn. Many only prohibit
a person from performing an abortion when he or she knows that
the procedure is being sought solely based on the sex of the
fetus.19 The scope of others, however, is less clear. The Arizona
statute, for example, does not state explicitly that it is limited to
cases in which an abortion is sought solely for the purposes of sex
selection.20 As a result, the law might be interpreted to apply
procedure); H.B. 1316, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Va. 2013) (“Any
person who intentionally performs an abortion with knowledge that the abortion
is sought solely and exclusively on account of the sex of the [fetus] is guilty of a
class 4 felony.”); Assemb. B. 217, 101st Leg., 2013–14 Reg. Sess. § 253.103 (Wis.
2013) (“No person may perform an abortion knowing that it is a sex-selective
abortion.”); Assemb. B. 2157, 215th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. § 2 (N.J. 2012)
(prohibiting a person from “knowingly perform[ing] a sex-selection or raceselection abortion”); H.B. 570, 129th Gen. Assemb., 2011–12 Sess. § 2919.20
(Ohio 2012) (proscribing the purposeful performance of sex-selection abortions,
including using force or funds to induce such procedures, and providing a civil
action for pregnant woman upon whom such an abortion is performed).
19. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT § 510/6(8) (1985) (prohibiting abortions
performed “with knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion
solely on account of the sex of the fetus”); H.B. 2253, 2013 Leg., 2013–14 Sess.
§ 10(a) (Kan. 2013) (same); H.B. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.D.
2013) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-731.2(B) (West 2010) (same); H.B.
1430, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 3 (Ind. 2013) (proscribing abortions
performed by a person who “knows that the pregnant woman is seeking a sexselective abortion”); S.B. 183, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 4 (Ind. 2013)
(same); H.B. 386, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 188.281(1) (Mo. 2013)
(prohibiting abortions performed “with the knowledge that the pregnant woman
is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the [fetus]”); S.B. 2286,
236th Leg. Sess., 2013–14 Reg. Sess. § 230-e(2) (N.Y. 2013) (same); H.B. 1316,
2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Va. 2013) (banning abortions “sought solely
and exclusively on account of” the fetus’s sex); Assemb. B. 217, 101st Leg., 2013–
14 Reg. Sess. § 253.103 (Wis. 2013) (prohibiting a person from performing an
abortion “knowing that it is a sex-selective abortion”). The Pennsylvania statute
appears to impose liability even when a person is merely reckless in performing
a sex-selection abortion. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204(a), (c), (d) (West 1989).
The proposed Oregon bill seems to provide for liability for performing an
abortion solely based on the sex of the fetus, even if the person performing the
sex-selection abortion does so neither knowingly nor recklessly. H.B. 3515, 77th
Leg. Assemb., 2013 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013).
20. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02(A) (2013). The proposed federal
Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2013 and bills introduced in
Colorado, Florida, and Ohio similarly omit the word “solely.” Prenatal
Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2013, H.R. 447, 113th Cong. (2013); H.B.
13-1131, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013); S.B. 13-056, 69th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013); H.B. 845, 2013 Leg., Leg. Sess. 2013. (Fla.
2013); S.B. 1072, 2013 Leg., Leg. Sess. 2013. (Fla. 2013); H.B. 570, 129th Gen.
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when sex selection is one, but not the only, reason an abortion is
sought. North Carolina’s sex-selection abortion ban is perhaps
the broadest of those adopted or proposed. The 2013 law extends
to any case in which a person performing an abortion has
“knowledge, or an objective reason to know, that a significant
factor in the woman seeking the abortion is related to the sex of
the [fetus].”21 Therefore, it clearly bans abortions when reasons
other than sex selection are present.
The scope of some sex-selection abortion bans is narrowed by
exceptions. The Illinois and Oklahoma bans, for instance, do not
bar sex-selection abortions that are sought when the fetus has, or
is suspected to have, a genetic abnormality.22 Virginia’s proposed
ban excludes abortions necessary to protect the life of the
woman.23 And the bans enacted in Arizona and Kansas, and those
Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2011-12 (Ohio 2012). Similar to the Pennsylvania statute,
the bill introduced in Texas seems to allow for liability when the person
performing the abortion does not know that it is being sought based solely on
the sex of the fetus. See H.B. 17, 83d Leg., 2d Reg. Session (Tex. 2013)
(prohibiting only knowingly performing a sex-selection abortion, not knowingly
performing an abortion that is known to be sought for purposes of sex selection).
21. S.B. 353, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 90-21.121 (N.C. 2013)
(emphasis added).
22. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 510/6(8) (1985) (“Nothing in Section 6(8)
shall be construed to proscribe the performance of an abortion on account of the
sex of the fetus because of a genetic disorder linked to that sex.”); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 1-731.2(B) (West 2010) (“Nothing in this section shall be
construed to proscribe the performance of an abortion because the [fetus] has a
genetic disorder that is sex-linked.”). The ban proposed in New York likewise
excludes abortions sought because of a genetic abnormality. See S.B. 2286,
236th Leg. Sess., 2013–14 Reg. Sess. § 230-e(2) (N.Y. 2013) (“Nothing in this
section shall be construed to proscribe the performance of an abortion because
the [fetus] has a genetic disorder that is sex-linked.”). North Dakota, on the
other hand, specifically prohibits abortions sought based on a genetic
abnormality. See H.B. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2(1) (N.D. 2013)
(“[A] physician may not intentionally perform . . . an abortion with knowledge
that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the [fetus] has
been diagnosed with . . . a genetic abnormality.”). Proposed bans in Indiana and
Missouri would do likewise. See S.B. 183, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 6
(Ind. 2013) (prohibiting an individual from intentionally performing an abortion
before and after viability “if the person knows that the pregnant woman is
seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with a genetic
abnormality”); H.B. 386, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 188.287(1) (Mo.
2013) (“No person shall intentionally perform . . . an abortion with knowledge
that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the [fetus] has
been diagnosed with . . . a genetic abnormality . . . .”).
23. See H.B. 1316, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Va. 2013) (“This
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proposed in Congress and in the Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Texas, and Virginia legislatures, explicitly exempt from liability a
woman seeking a sex-selection abortion.24
III. Roe and Casey Generally
No matter its scope, a sex-selection abortion ban must pass
through Casey to survive a constitutional challenge, and to
understand Casey, it is important to begin with Roe. Although the
Court in Roe found a woman’s right to choose abortion within the
now long-recognized right to privacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment,25 the Court cautioned that the abortion right is not
absolute26 and is “inherently different” from other privacy
rights.27 According to the Court, a woman’s right to choose must
section shall not prohibit the use by a physician of any procedure that, in
reasonable medical judgment, is necessary to prevent the death of the
mother . . . .”).
24. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02(E) (1978) (West) (“A woman on
whom a sex-selection or race-selection abortion is performed is not subject to
criminal prosecution or civil liability . . . .”); Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act
(PRENDA) of 2013, H.R. 447, 113th Cong. § 3(a) (2013) (“A woman upon whom a
sex-selection or race-selection abortion is performed may not be prosecuted or
held civilly liable . . . .”); H.B. 2253, 2013 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. § 10(c) (Kan. 2013)
(“A woman upon whom an abortion is performed shall not be prosecuted . . . .”);
H.B. 386, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 188.296(2) (Mo. 2013)
(establishing that any woman upon whom a prohibited abortion is performed
shall not be prosecuted or held civilly or criminally liable); H.B. 17, 83d Leg., 2d
Sess. § 170.003(e) (Tex. 2013) (exempting a woman on whom a prohibited
abortion is performed from criminal liability); H.B. 1316, 2013 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. § 1 (Va. 2013) (“The mother may not be prosecuted for any criminal
offense based on the performance of any [prohibited] act . . . .”); Assemb. B.
2157, 215th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. § 4 (N.J. 2012) (same); H.B. 570, 129th Gen.
Assemb., 2011–12 Sess. § 2919.20(D) (Ohio 2012) (same). The bans proposed in
Florida only would exempt minor women from liability. See H.B. 845, 115th
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(6)(e) (Fla. 2013) (“A mother of a [fetus] on whom a sexselection or race-selection termination of pregnancy is performed who as not
attained 18 years of age . . . is not subject to criminal prosecution or civil
liability . . . .”); S.B. 1072, 115th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(6)(e) (Fla. 2013) (same).
25. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973) (finding that the right to
privacy includes the right to have an abortion).
26. See id. (explaining that the right to choose abortion is not free from all
government interference).
27. See id. at 159 (stating that the existence of potential human life
differentiates this privacy right from those such as marital intimacy,
procreation, or education of one’s children).
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be balanced against three important state interests:
“safeguarding health, . . . maintaining medical standards, and . . .
protecting potential life.”28 “At some point in pregnancy,” the
Court explained, “these respective interests become sufficiently
compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the
abortion decision.”29
The Court’s assessment of the state’s interests in protecting
women’s health and in guarding potential life resulted in Roe’s
famous trimester framework.30 Under this framework, until the
end of the first trimester, neither interest is compelling31 and
therefore “the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left
to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending
physician.”32 At about the end of the first trimester, however, the
state’s interest in the pregnant woman’s health becomes
compelling, allowing the state to “regulate the abortion procedure
in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.”33 It is
not until the fetus attains viability—when it is “potentially able
to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid”34—
that the state’s interest in protecting potential life becomes
compelling and justifies measures that “regulate, [or] even
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.”35
The Roe Court’s trimester framework proved unkind to many
abortion regulations. Under this framework, the Court struck
down the Texas statute at issue in Roe, which had outlawed
abortion except when necessary to save the life of the woman.36
28. Id. at 154.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 162–63 (describing a balance of the state’s interests against
those of the woman).
31. See id. at 163 (establishing that neither interest becomes compelling
until “approximately the end of the first trimester”).
32. Id. at 164.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 160.
35. Id. at 165.
36. See id. at 164 (concluding that Texas’s failure to distinguish between
different stages in the pregnancy and its limiting the procedure only to
circumstances in which a woman’s life is at risk rendered its statute
unconstitutional).
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The Court dealt likewise with other lesser abortion regulations
that later came before it,37 finding these regulations incapable of
satisfying the Court’s most exacting standard of review—strict
scrutiny—under which a measure may “be sustained only if
drawn in narrow terms to further a compelling state interest.”38
In Casey, the Court determined that the cases subsequent to
Roe went too far and failed to recognize the weight of the state’s
interests.39 Presented with the opportunity to overrule Roe,
however, it declined and instead retained Roe’s “essential
holding,” which the Court described as consisting of three parts:
First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to
have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without
undue interference from the State. Before viability, the State’s
interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of
abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the
woman’s effective right to elect the procedure. Second is a
confirmation of the State’s power to restrict abortions after
fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies
which endanger the woman’s life or health. And third is the
principle that the State has legitimate interests from the
outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman
and the life of the fetus that may become a child.40

The Court in Casey determined that the third principle had been
neglected in later cases that applied Roe’s trimester framework.41
Consequently, it abandoned this “elaborate, but rigid construct”42
in favor of an “undue burden” standard, which the Court asserted
37. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 759, 771 (1986) (endorsing “the general principles laid down in Roe”
and finding unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute that required a woman to
be provided with certain information before having an abortion); City of Akron
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 428–30, 452 (1983)
(applying Roe’s trimester framework to strike down an ordinance requiring
informed consent, a waiting period, and parental consent).
38. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992).
39. See id. at 872 (noting that the Court’s later application of the trimester
framework “sometimes contradicted the State’s permissible exercise of its
powers”).
40. Id. at 846.
41. See id. at 871 (“Roe v. Wade speaks with clarity in establishing not only
the woman’s liberty but also the State’s ‘important and legitimate interest in
potential life.’ That portion of the decision . . . has been given too little
acknowledgment and implementation . . . .”).
42. Id. at 872.
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was “the appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest [in
potential life] with the woman’s constitutionally protected
liberty.”43
The Court in Casey “reaffirm[ed] Roe’s holding” that, after
viability, a state has the power to prohibit abortion so long as
exceptions are made for circumstances in which the life or health
of the woman are at stake.44 It was as to pre-viability measures
that Casey made a change, opting for its undue burden standard
over Roe’s trimester framework.45 Under this new standard, the
Court explained, “[a]n undue burden exists, and therefore a
provision of a law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
before the fetus attains viability.”46 Absent such purpose or effect,
a regulation designed to encourage a woman to give birth or to
protect the woman’s health will be sustained so long as it has a
rational basis.47 The Pennsylvania statute at issue in Casey—
which included an informed consent provision, a twenty-fourhour waiting period, and a parental consent requirement—
largely passed the test.48

43. Id. at 876.
44. See id. at 879 (stating that the adoption of the undue burden test does
not disturb Roe’s holding that a state may restrict a woman’s right to choose
abortion after viability).
45. See id. at 872 (explaining that under Roe’s trimester framework “almost
no regulation at all is permitted during the first trimester of pregnancy,” which
“sometimes contradict[s] the State’s permissible exercise of its power”).
46. Id. at 878.
47. See id. (“[A] state measure designed to persuade her to choose
childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal.
Regulations designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion are
valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.”).
48. See id. at 887, 895, 899 (finding that the twenty-four-hour waiting
period, informed consent, and parental consent requirements do not
unconstitutionally impose an undue burden, but concluding that the spousal
notification provision unconstitutionally burdens a woman’s right to choose
abortion).
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IV. Surviving Casey

All of the sex-selection abortion bans that have been enacted
or proposed, with the exception of the one in Oregon,49 are
effective throughout pregnancy. Therefore, most of the bans must
satisfy both the pre-viability and post-viability standards
outlined in Casey.50
What Casey states generally about a woman’s right to choose
abortion and the way the opinion explains the undue burden
standard raise significant doubts as to whether any pre-viability
sex-selection abortion ban is permissible. It seems appropriate,
then, to begin considering this question by examining the
constitutionality of a sex-selection abortion ban in its narrowest
form—one that, like those adopted in Kansas, Illinois, North
Dakota, and Oklahoma, prohibits a person from performing an
abortion knowing that it is being sought solely based on the sex of

49. Compare H.B. 3515, 77th Leg. Assemb., 2013 Reg. Sess. § 1 (Or. 2013)
(prohibiting only “late-term sex-selection abortion,” defined as “an abortion
performed during the third trimester of pregnancy”), with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63 § 1-731.2(B) (West 2010) (applying the ban throughout pregnancy); Prenatal
Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2013, H.R. 447, 113th Cong. § 3(a)(1)
(2013) (same); H.B. 2253, 2013 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. § 10(a) (Kan. 2013) (same);
S.B. 353, 2013 Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 90-21.121(a) (N.C. 2013) (same);
H.B. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1(a) (N.D. 2013) (same); H.B. 1131,
69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 18-3.5-203(1) (Colo. 2013) (same); S.B. 56,
69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 18-3.5-203(1) (Colo. 2013) (same); H.B. 845,
115th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(6)(a) (Fla. 2013) (same); S.B. 1072, 115th Leg., Reg.
Sess. § 3(6)(a) (Fla. 2013) (same); H.B. 1430, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess.
§ 3 (Ind. 2013) (specifying that the prohibition on sex-selection abortions applies
to those performed both pre-viability and post-viability); S.B. 183, 118th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 4 (Ind. 2013) (same); H.B. 386, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. § 188.281(1) (Mo. 2013) (prohibiting sex-selection abortions performed
at any point in the pregnancy); S.B. 2286, 236th Leg. Sess., 2013–14 Reg. Sess.
§ 230-e(2) (N.Y. 2013) (same); H.B. 570, 129th Gen. Assemb., 2011–12 Sess.
§ 2919.20 (Ohio 2012) (same); H.B. 17, 83d Leg., 2d Sess. § 170.003(a) (Tex.
2013) (same); H.B. 1316, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Va. 2013) (same);
Assemb. B. 217, 101st Leg., 2013–14 Reg. Sess. § 253.103 (Wis. 2013) (same);
Assemb. B. 2157, 215th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. § 2 (N.J. 2012) (same); and H.B.
2443, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 13-3603.02(A)(1) (Ariz. 2011) (banning the
performance of sex-selection abortions without regard to the point in the
pregnancy).
50. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156 (2007) (“The abortions
affected by the Act’s regulations take place both previability and postviability;
so . . . the undue burden analysis . . . [is] applicable.”).
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the fetus. 51 This Part evaluates such a narrow ban and offers an
argument in support of its constitutionality. Part V discusses how
broader bans might fare.
A. An Easy Case Post-Viability
Casey’s treatment of post-viability abortion regulations is
consistent with Roe and relatively clear: “[S]ubsequent to
viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of
human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe,
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.”52 A post-viability sex-selection abortion ban that
contains explicit health and life exceptions, therefore, easily
satisfies Casey. None of the enacted or proposed sex-selection
abortion bans, however, specify a health exception, and only the
ban proposed in Virginia expressly excludes abortions that are
necessary to protect a woman’s life.53 Nevertheless, based on the
Court’s decision in Gonzales, a narrow sex-selection abortion ban
without specific life or health exceptions is constitutional.54
In Gonzales, the Court upheld the 2003 federal partial-birth
abortion ban notwithstanding the fact that the law did not
51. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 510/6(8) (1985) (proscribing sex-selection
abortions intentionally performed by any person “with knowledge that the
pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the
fetus”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-731.2(B) (West 2010) (prohibiting any person
from “knowingly or recklessly perform[ing] . . . an abortion with knowledge that
the pregnant female is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the
[fetus]”); H.B. 2253, 2013 Leg., 2013–14 Sess. § 10(a) (Kan. 2013) (barring any
“person” from performing or inducing an abortion “with knowledge that the
pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of the
[fetus]”); H.B. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1(a) (N.D. 2013) (prohibiting
a physician from “intentionally performing . . . an abortion with knowledge that
the pregnant woman is seeking an abortion solely” because of the fetus’s sex).
52. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992)
(quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973)).
53. See H.B. 1316, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Va. 2013) (“This
section shall not prohibit the use by a physician of any procedure that, in
reasonable medical judgment, is necessary to prevent the death of the
mother . . . .”).
54. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 166–67 (upholding a federal prohibition on
partial-birth abortion despite the absence of a health exception).
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include a health exception, and the Court did so even though
there was significant disagreement as to whether the use of the
partial-birth abortion procedure might be medically necessary in
some circumstances.55 A narrow sex-selection abortion ban
presents a stronger case than the ban on partial-birth abortion at
issue in Gonzales because no serious argument can be made that
an abortion sought solely based on the sex of the fetus ever is
medically necessary. If a woman seeks an abortion when her life
or health is at stake, she is not seeking the procedure solely based
on the sex of the fetus, and the procedure would not be barred
even if the sex of the fetus were a consideration. For example, a
narrow ban would not prohibit abortion of a female fetus if
having a girl somehow would be detrimental to a woman’s
physical, mental, or emotional health. In such a case, the woman
would be seeking the abortion not solely based on the sex of the
fetus, but because of the sex of the fetus and the associated effect
on her health. Thus, a sex-selection abortion ban in its narrowest
form should satisfy Casey’s post-viability requirements even
without explicit life and health exceptions.
B. An Uphill Climb Pre-Viability
“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt,”56 the
Court began in Casey. Yet, in contrast to the standard for postviability restrictions, the Court’s explanation of the conditions
under which pre-viability measures are permitted has left much
in doubt. The extent of the uncertainty becomes particularly
evident when one tries to assess the constitutionality of a sexselection abortion ban that applies prior to viability.
Casey is unclear as to whether or how its undue burden
standard applies to a pre-viability abortion ban. One view, which
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
articulated in Isaacson v. Horne,57 is that Casey categorically bars
any type of pre-viability ban without regard to the undue burden
55. See id. at 162–65 (reasoning that the Court has previously “given state
and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there
is medical and scientific uncertainty”).
56. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
57. 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013).
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standard.58 Another is that Casey’s undue burden test applies,
but the only consideration under the test is the effect of a ban on
a woman’s ability to make the “ultimate decision.”59 If either of
these two interpretations is correct, any sex-selection abortion
ban—no matter how narrow—is bound to fail.
Casey, however, leaves open the possibility of a third
interpretation. The Court’s treatment of the parental consent
provisions at issue in the case suggests that the undue burden
test applies to a pre-viability ban and that relevant to the test are
government interests that are different from those considered in
Roe and Casey.60 If that is so, there is hope for a narrow sexselection abortion ban, which advances a state’s interest in
eliminating sex discrimination, an interest the Court has
recognized as compelling in its jurisprudence regarding the First
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of association for expressive
purposes.
1. Pre-Viability Bans Unconstitutional Per Se?
Before delving into the third possible interpretation of Casey,
due attention must be given to the first two, for there certainly is
ample support for them. The Ninth Circuit employed the first
interpretation in Isaacson; United States District Courts in
Idaho, Arkansas, and North Dakota applied the second in other
cases.
In Isaacson, the Ninth Circuit struck down an Arizona law—
commonly referred to as a “fetal pain statute”—that prohibited
abortion beginning at twenty weeks’ gestation,61 the time at
58. See id. at 1225 (striking down an Arizona ban on abortion after twenty
weeks because it “prohibits pre-viability abortions”).
59. See McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1144, 1150–51 (D.
Idaho 2013) (applying the undue burden test to find that a fetal pain statute
unconstitutionally placed an “insurmountable obstacle” in the path of a woman
seeking to abort a nonviable fetus (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992))).
60. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992)
(reaffirming that “a State may require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the
consent of a parent or guardian, provided that there is an adequate judicial
bypass procedure”).
61. See Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F. 3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that
the challenged provision “extends the abortion ban earlier in pregnancy, to the
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which the State contended a fetus can begin to feel pain,62 though
before viability.63 In declaring Arizona’s fetal pain statute
unconstitutional, the court claimed that the Supreme Court’s
precedent is clear:
[A] woman has a constitutional right to choose to terminate
her pregnancy before the fetus is viable. A prohibition on the
exercise of that right is per se unconstitutional. While the state
may regulate the mode and manner of abortion prior to fetal
viability, it may not proscribe a woman from electing abortion,
nor may it impose an undue burden on her choice through
regulation.64

According to the Ninth Circuit, there was no need to evaluate
whether the statute imposed an undue burden, and the lower
court was wrong to do so: “[T]his ‘undue burden’/‘substantial
obstacle’ mode of analysis has no place where, as here, the state
is forbidding certain women from choosing pre-viability abortions
rather than specifying the conditions under which such abortions
are to be allowed.”65
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Casey undoubtedly is a
reasonable one. The Court in Casey stated that, “[r]egardless of
whether exceptions are made for particular circumstances, a
State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate
decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability.”66 Moreover,
in preserving this “essential holding” of Roe, the Court indicated
that, “[b]efore viability, the State’s interests are not strong
enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a
substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the

period between twenty weeks gestation and fetal viability”). The prohibition
included an exception for medical emergencies. Id.
62. See id. at 1218 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2151(6) (2012) to explain
that the prohibition is “based on . . . strong medical evidence that unborn
children feel pain during an abortion at that gestational age”).
63. See id. at 1225 (stating that because the parties agree “that no fetus is
viable at twenty weeks gestational age,” as supported by the district court
findings, the challenged statute “necessarily prohibits pre-viability abortions”).
64. Id. at 1217.
65. Id. at 1225.
66. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992). The
Ninth Circuit pointed out that the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124 (2007), did not disturb this principal. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1223–24.
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procedure.”67 By speaking separately of a prohibition and the
imposition of a substantial obstacle, the Court seemed to indicate
that a pre-viability ban is an absolute obstacle and therefore
unconstitutional per se. In addition, that Casey, like Roe, permits
a state to prohibit abortion after viability suggests that a state
may not do so before viability.68
Not all courts considering pre-viability bans have taken the
same approach as the Ninth Circuit. Other courts considering
pre-viability bans have applied the undue burden test, but they
have done so in a way that suggests a similar per se bar. In
McCormack v. Hiedeman,69 the U.S. District Court for the
District of Idaho decided that Idaho’s fetal pain statute
“unconstitutionally burden[ed] the abortion right.”70 According to
the Idaho district court, Casey permits only two types of
regulation: (1) regulations designed to inform a woman’s choice
and (2) those aimed at protecting a woman’s health.71 Because
Idaho’s fetal pain statute did neither, it was unconstitutional.72
According to the court, the statute was not intended to inform a
woman’s choice, but instead “to narrow the universe of previously
allowable pre-viability abortions,”73 and the state had not even
attempted to justify the law as an effort to protect a woman’s
health or safety.74 Its purpose and effect, the court asserted, was
not just to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman

67. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
68. See id. at 879 (“We also reaffirm Roe’s holding that ‘subsequent to
viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life
may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion . . . .”).
69. 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Idaho 2013).
70. Id. at 1149–50.
71. See id. (noting that prior to viability “the State may not rely on its
interest in the potential life of the fetus to place a substantial obstacle to
abortion . . . in women’s paths”).
72. See id. at 1150 (explaining further that the statute neither seeks to
persuade a woman to choose childbirth over abortion nor mentions the mother’s
health or safety as a purpose).
73. Id.
74. See id. (finding that the stated purpose of the statute “is to protect a
fetus ‘from the state at which substantial medical evidence indicates that they
are capable of feeling pain’”).
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who wants to abort a nonviable fetus, but an “insurmountable” or
“absolute” one.75
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas in Edwards v. Beck76 and the United States District
Court for the District of North Dakota in MKB Management
Corp. v. Burdick77 likewise applied Casey’s undue burden test to
Arkansas and North Dakota “fetal heartbeat statutes,” which
prohibit abortions at or after twelve or six weeks’ gestation when
a fetal heartbeat is detected.78 Unlike the court in Heideman,
however, neither the Arkansas district court nor the North
Dakota district court engaged the undue burden test in a
meaningful way, doing little more than indicating that the test
applies, describing what it requires, and concluding that the fetal
heartbeat statutes imposed an unconstitutional burden on a
woman’s right to choose.79
It is just as easy to find support in Casey for the
interpretation utilized in Heideman, Beck, and MKB Management
as it is for the view the Ninth Circuit expressed in Isaacson. The
Court in Casey indicates that “[a] finding of an undue burden is a
shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus” and that “[a]
statute with this purpose [or effect] is invalid.”80 The test, then,
appears to focus only on the interests of the woman. If a law
75. Id. at 1151.
76. 946 F. Supp. 2d 843 (E.D. Ark. 2013).
77. No. 1:13-cv-071, 2013 WL 3779740 (D.N.D. July 22, 2013) (granting the
plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction).
78. See Edwards, 946 F. Supp. at 845, 848 (considering the Arkansas fetal
heartbeat statute and noting that “[t]he Eighth Circuit has adopted the ‘undueburden test’ for facial challenges to abortion laws”); Burdick, 2013 WL 3779740,
at *9 (considering the North Dakota heartbeat statute and finding that it
imposes an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose).
79. See Edwards, 946 F. Supp. 2d at 850 (noting that the Eighth Circuit
applies the undue burden test in evaluating abortion laws and concluding that
the Arkansas fetal heartbeat statute “impermissibly infringes a woman’s
Fourteenth Amendment right to cho[o]se” to have an abortion before viability);
Burdick, 2013 WL 3779740, at *1, *10 (“The plaintiffs have clearly shown that
H.B. 1456 more than likely prohibits pre-viability abortions in a large
percentage of cases in North Dakota, thereby imposing an undue burden on
women seeking to obtain an abortion.”).
80. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
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hinders her ability to have an abortion, it is unconstitutional, and
a ban does not just hinder her ability, it eliminates it.
2. Avoiding a Rush to Judgment: An Alternative Interpretation
Of course, the decisions in Heideman, Beck, MKB
Management, and Isaacson do not necessarily foretell the
unconstitutionality of sex-selection abortion bans because sexselection abortion bans are different from fetal pain and
heartbeat statutes in at least three significant ways. First, sexselection abortion bans are narrow and do not seek to replace
viability as the time at which the state begins to have a broad
right to restrict abortion.81 Second, while states largely rely on
their interests in potential life and maternal health to justify
fetal pain and heartbeat statutes,82 sex-selection abortion bans
introduce other interests, including that of eradicating sex
discrimination from society. Third, fetal pain and heartbeat
statutes focus on the fetus—when it can feel pain or has a
heartbeat; sex-selection abortion bans focus on the woman—the
reasons for her decision and the possible impact of her decision on
society at large.

81. See Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1229 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Section 7
effectively shifts from viability to twenty weeks gestation the point at which the
state’s asserted interests override a woman’s right to choose . . . .”); McCormack
v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1150 (D. Idaho 2013) (“In essence, the
PUCPA embodies a legislative judgment equating viability with twenty weeks’
gestational age, which the Supreme Court expressly forbids.”); Edwards, 946 F.
Supp. 2d at 850 (“Act 301 equates fetal viability with a 12-week gestational age
and a fetal heartbeat . . . .”); Burdick, 2013 WL 3779740, at *9 (“[T]he new law
seems to suggest that a fetus is viable at the point a heartbeat is detected.”).
82. See Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1219 (noting that the district court had
determined that the State’s interest in potential life and maternal health
justified Arizona’s fetal pain statute); McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1149–50
(noting that the Idaho fetal heartbeat law could not be justified by the State’s
interest in potential life or women’s health); Edwards v. Beck, 946 F. Supp. 2d
843, 847 (E.D. Ark. 2013) (observing a woman’s right to choose abortion is
balanced against state interests in potential life and maternal health and that
Casey concludes that the state’s interests are not sufficient to justify prohibition
prior to viability). North Dakota, in support of its fetal heartbeat statute, relied
on “preserving the integrity of the medical profession [and] preventing the
coarsening of society’s moral sense” as additional justifications. Burdick, 2013
WL 3779740, at *4.
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a. Casey May Only Bar Blanket or Comprehensive Abortion Bans
The courts striking down the fetal pain and heartbeat
statutes emphasize a problem with the breadth of those
statutes.83 According to the Ninth Circuit in Isaacson, when
adopting its fetal pain statute, Arizona had “fail[ed] to follow the
Supreme Court’s clear rule that no woman may be entirely
precluded from choosing to terminate her pregnancy at any time
prior to viability.”84 Perhaps, then, Casey only bars blanket or
comprehensive bans—those outlawing abortion with or without
exceptions—that apply for some period of time prior to viability.
There is evidence in Casey to support this conclusion.
The Court in Casey indicated that it was reaffirming Roe’s
essential holding, but it described that holding in various ways
throughout the opinion. Some of the Court’s statements suggest
that any pre-viability ban is unconstitutional;85 others indicate
that only blanket bans are.86 If the Court’s claim that it was
reaffirming what was essential in Roe is to be taken seriously, it
would seem appropriate to give more weight to the statements
that are more faithful to Roe itself and to consider the less
faithful ones merely as attempts to paraphrase. By interpreting
the opinion in this way, one reasonably can argue that Casey only
prohibits blanket bans.
As to pre-viability measures, Casey is most faithful to Roe in
two places. At the outset of its opinion, the Court notes the
83. See Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1227 (noting that Arizona’s twenty-week law
deprives women of the right to choose abortion at all after twenty weeks
gestation); McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1151 (indicating that Idaho’s fetal
pain statute represented “an outright ban on abortions at or after twenty weeks’
gestation”); Edwards, 946 F. Supp. 2d at 849 (observing that the Arkansas law
“prohibits all abortions, . . . where the pregnancy has progressed to twelve
weeks and a fetal heartbeat is detected”); MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Burdick, No.
1:13-cv-071, 2013 WL 3779740 at *2 (D.N.D. July 22, 2013), (indicating that the
North Dakota fetal heartbeat statute “would essentially ban abortions in the
State of North Dakota”).
84. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1228 (emphasis added).
85. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992)
(indicating that a state may not prevent “any woman from making the ultimate
decision to terminate her pregnancy prior to viability”).
86. See infra text accompanying notes 87–88 and 90 (identifying
statements that support the conclusion that Casey bars only blanket or
comprehensive bans).
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importance of describing Roe’s essential holding “with clarity”
and, attempting to do that, states: “Before viability, the State’s
interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of
abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the
woman’s effective right to elect the procedure.”87 Later, consistent
with the first statement, the Court asserts that Roe had
determined that the “weight [of the State’s interest in protecting
potential life] is insufficient to justify a ban on abortions prior to
viability even when it is subject to certain exceptions” and that
“the essential holding of Roe should be reaffirmed.”88 These
statements reflect the particular decision the Court had to make
in Roe—the constitutionality of a Texas statute that outlawed
abortion except when necessary to save the life of the woman.89
When considered in light of that statute, the statements in Casey
suggest that the Constitution bars only a comprehensive ban
prior to viability, not a narrow ban when justified by a state
interest that neither Roe nor Casey considered.
The statement in Casey that is most consistent with Roe
regarding what a state may do post-viability also supports this
conclusion. In summarizing the implications of its adoption of the
undue burden standard, the Court quotes Roe: “We . . . reaffirm
Roe’s holding that ‘subsequent to viability, the State in promoting
its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses,
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation
of the life or health of the mother.’”90 Again, the Court hearkens
back to the statute at issue in Roe, which unconstitutionally
attempted to do pre-viability what is permissible only postviability. By looking to the statute at issue in Roe, then, one can
see an appealing symmetry: pre-viability, a state may not adopt a
blanket ban even with exceptions; post-viability, it may, so long
as there are exceptions that permit abortion when the life or
health of the woman is at risk. Narrow pre-viability bans,
therefore, are not necessarily prohibited.
87. Id. at 846.
88. Id. at 871.
89. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117–18 (1973) (describing the Texas
statute at issue in the case).
90. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65) (emphasis
added).
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Still, it is hard to reconcile this interpretation with Roe’s
holding that, “[f]or the stage prior to approximately the end of the
first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be
left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending
physician”91 and with Casey’s assertion that “a State may not
prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to
terminate her pregnancy before viability.”92 The Court’s
treatment of the parental consent requirement at issue in Casey,
however, indicates that these statements cannot be taken too far.
The subject of Casey was the Pennsylvania Abortion Control
Act of 1982, which among other things provided that an
unemancipated woman under the age of eighteen could not,
without the consent of one of her parents, a guardian or a person
“standing in loco parentis,” choose to have an abortion, except in
the case of a medical emergency.93 As a safety mechanism, the
statute included a judicial bypass provision that allowed a court
to override the parental consent requirement if the court were to
determine that the woman is “mature and capable of giving
informed consent” or that an abortion is in the best interests of
the woman.94 Casey characterized Pennsylvania’s parental
consent requirement as a “structural mechanism by which . . . the
parent or guardian of a minor[] may express profound respect for
the life of the unborn,”95 but in substance the requirement—at
least theoretically—“banned” pre-viability abortions in a narrow
set of circumstances. The Pennsylvania statute did not leave all
women with the right to make the “ultimate decision.”96 To the
contrary, the law took the decision entirely out of a woman’s
hands when (i) she is a minor, (ii) one of her parents does not
consent, (iii) she is not mature and capable of making the decision
for herself, and (iv) an abortion is not in her best interests.
91. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
92. Casey, 505 at 879 (emphasis added).
93. See id. at 899, 904–05 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206(b) (1990)).
94. See id. at 899, 905 (allowing the court to authorize an abortion if it
would be within the minor woman’s best interests, without specifying how the
court should determine the woman’s best interests).
95. Id. at 877.
96. Id. at 879 (applying Roe’s “central holding” that “a State may not
prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision” to the Pennsylvania
statute).
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Nevertheless, the Court—as it had done previously when
applying Roe to similar parental consent requirements97—
determined that such a ban is constitutional.98 Thus, when the
Court in Casey stated that “a State may not prohibit any woman
from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy
before viability,”99 it could not have meant, literally, any woman.
To claim that the Court, when referring to the rights of “any
woman,” meant any adult woman would contradict what the
Court pointed out in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth:100 “Constitutional rights do not mature and come into
being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights. . . .”101 The
question, then, is why certain women may be prohibited from
making “the ultimate decision.” The answer is the presence of an
interest that is different from the three specifically identified in
Roe and Casey, an interest related to the woman and not the
fetus.
b. Casey May Permit Narrow Bans When Supported by Other
Interests
Casey’s treatment of Pennsylvania’s parental-consent
requirement not only confirms that a state may adopt a limited
ban, it also indicates that a state may do so if it has an interest of
sufficient strength that is different from those considered in Roe
and Casey. In reaching the conclusion that viability creates the
appropriate balance for the rights of the woman and the rights of
the state, Roe and Casey considered only two state interests—
97. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 519–20 (1990)
(upholding a parental consent requirement with judicial bypass provision);
Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kan. City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490–
94 (1983) (same).
98. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992)
(“Our cases establish, and we reaffirm today, that a State may require a minor
seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian, provided that
there is an adequate judicial bypass procedure.”).
99. Id. at 879.
100. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
101. Id. at 74–75.
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safeguarding women’s health and protecting potential life.102
Although it does not say so explicitly, the Court in Casey must
have allowed the limited “ban” under the Pennsylvania parental
consent requirement because of another state interest—that of
protecting minors.103 Therefore, when Casey states that, “before
viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a
prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle
to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure,”104 the
interests the Court was referring to were those it had weighed in
settling on viability as the dividing line for abortion regulation.105
Indeed, when Casey describes Roe’s holding with respect to when
a legislative ban is justified, it focuses on the state’s interest in
potential life: “[V]iability marks the earliest point at which the
State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a
legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.”106
Yet, language in Casey does suggest that, even when other
interests are present, a law is invalid if it places a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion: “[A] statute
which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some
other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be considered a
permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.”107 Again, the
Court’s treatment of the Pennsylvania parental consent
requirement indicates that the Court should not be taken literally
and that state interests other than those considered in Roe and
Casey are relevant to the undue burden test. The Court in Casey
applied the undue burden standard to the parental consent

102. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text (identifying the interests
considered in Roe and Casey).
103. See Planned Parenthood of Idaho v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 922 (9th
Cir. 2004) (“With regard to minors, . . . the state has additional interests that
may justify regulation of the manner in which they determine to undergo the
procedure.” (citing Danforth, 482 U.S. at 74)).
104. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
105. See Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1222 (2013) (listing the interests
the Court considered in Roe and stating, “those interests could not justify any
regulation of abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy” (emphasis added)
(citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973))).
106. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 877.
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provisions108 and determined that they did not impose an undue
burden, notwithstanding the fact that they took the decision
entirely out of certain women’s hands and placed it in those of
either her parent or the court.109 In reaching that conclusion,
then, the Court must have considered an interest other than
those of safeguarding a woman’s health, protecting potential life,
and regulating the medical profession.
The Court in Casey actually paid very little attention to the
parental consent provisions, stating instead that “[w]e have been
over most of this ground before.”110 Notably, when it did so before,
the Court considered other interests. For example, in City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,111 the Court
observed that a “majority of the Court [in Bellotti v. Baird112 had]
indicated that a State’s interest in protecting immature minors
will sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either
parental or judicial.”113 Moreover, the Court in Akron identified
the two interests in Roe that had justified abortion regulations—
108. Id. at 877–78 (referring to the Pennsylvania parental consent
provisions in discussing “guiding principles” for the undue burden test).
109. Interestingly, the Court does not even mention its undue burden test
when it evaluates the parental consent provision. Instead it cites prior cases and
merely concludes that the Pennsylvania statute is constitutional. Id. at 899.
Some of the opinions in prior cases that Casey cites (one of which is a
concurrence by Justice O’Connor), however, employed an undue burden
standard in reviewing parental consent provisions. See Ohio v. Akron Center for
Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 519–20 (1990) (“The Ohio statute, in sum does not
impose an undue, or otherwise unconstitutional, burden on a minor seeking an
abortion. We believe, in addition, that the legislature acted in a rational manner
in enacting H.B. 319.”); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 461 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“It has been my understanding in this area that ‘[i]f
the particular regulation does not ‘unduly burde[n]’ the fundamental right, . . .
then our evaluation of that regulation is limited to our determination that the
regulation rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose.” (citing Akron v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983))); Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (finding that a Massachusetts parental consent statute
“impose[d] an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the right to seek an
abortion”). Moreover, in Casey’s discussion of “guiding principles” for its undue
burden test, the Court cites its consideration of the Pennsylvania parental
consent statute as an example of a regulation that does not constitute an undue
burden. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
110. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992).
111. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
112. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
113. Akron, 462 U.S. at 439.
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protection of potential life and protection of a woman’s health—
but noted that “the Court repeatedly has recognized that, in view
of the unique status of children under the law, the States have a
‘significant’ interest in certain abortion regulations aimed at
protecting children ‘that is not present in the case of an adult.’”114
This “significant” interest sustained the parental consent
limitations at issue in Casey even though the limitations applied
from the outset of pregnancy.115
Following Casey, the Court has continued to consider preCasey precedent with respect to parental consent provisions,
notwithstanding the Court’s adoption of the undue burden
standard.116 These prior cases were decided under strict scrutiny,
a standard of review that always gives the state an opportunity to
explain itself,117 suggesting that a state is permitted to justify
itself under Casey’s undue burden test.
Gonzales also indicates that additional state interests are
relevant to the undue burden test. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg in
her dissent in Gonzales accused the majority of taking into
account other interests when it upheld the federal partial-birth
abortion ban.118 The majority purports to ground its decision in
114. Id. at 427 n.10 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976)); see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990)
(“The State has a strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of its young
citizens . . . .”); Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 490–91 (“A State’s interest in protecting
immature minors will sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either
parental of judicial.”).
115. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 899 (concluding that Pennsylvania’s parental
consent provisions were constitutional); Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 493 (determining
that Missouri’s parental consent requirement was constitutional).
116. See Planned Parenthood of Idaho v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 922 n.12
(2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court chastised (and reversed) this court for failing to
apply Bellotti II and Akron II faithfully.” (citing Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S.
292, 295–97 (1997))); Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1222 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“Casey jettisoned . . . the strict scrutiny standard applied in Roe.”).
117. See Wasden, 376 F.3d at 922 n.12 (noting that the pre-Casey cases
addressing parental consent statutes applied strict scrutiny, and not the undue
burden standard); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871
(1992) (noting the cases involving Roe “decided that any regulation touching
upon the abortion decision must survive strict scrutiny, to be sustained only if
drawn in narrow terms to further a compelling state interest.”).
118. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 182 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“Ultimately, the Court admits that ‘moral concerns’ are at work, concerns that
could yield prohibitions on any abortion. Notably, the concerns expressed are
untethered to any ground genuinely serving the Government’s interest in
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the state’s interests in protecting potential life and regulating the
medical profession,119 but it is evident that other interests were at
work, for the Court states: “There can be no doubt the
government has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics
of the medical profession.”120 Likewise, by noting an important
purpose of the federal partial-birth abortion ban, the Court
indicated the relevance of the state’s interest in protecting life
outside the womb: “Implicitly approving such a brutal and
inhumane procedure by choosing not to prohibit it will further
coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all
vulnerable and innocent human life, making it increasingly
difficult to protect such life.”121
Finally, if the undue burden test does not allow for
consideration of additional state interests, then a woman
effectively has an absolute right to have an abortion pre-viability,
a consequence that is anathema to the principle that no
fundamental right is absolute and the state always has the
opportunity to justify itself.122 Consistent with this idea, Casey
indicates that the woman’s right is “to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion,”123 and that “[n]ot all government
preserving life.”).
119. See id. at 157 (noting that “the State has a significant role to play in
regulating the medical profession” and that “[t]he government may use its voice
and its regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the life within the
woman”).
120. Id. Interestingly, this interest may have been identified in Roe, but it
disappeared when the Court established viability as the line at which the state’s
power to restrict abortion increases.
121. Id. (quoting the congressional findings in support of the Act).
122. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3056 (2010) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (“No fundamental right—not even the First Amendment—is
absolute.”); id. at 3101 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he strength of the
individual’s liberty interests and the State’s regulatory interests must always be
assessed and compared. No right is absolute.”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873–75 (1992) (noting that the Court in Roe “was not
recognizing an absolute right” “[a]s our jurisprudence relating to all liberties
save perhaps abortion have recognized, not every law which makes a right more
difficult to exercise is, ipso facto, an infringement of that right”); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973) (“The Court’s decisions recognizing a right of
privacy also acknowledge that some state regulation in areas protected by that
right is appropriate.”); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85 (1949) (“[E]ven the
fundamental rights of the Bill of Rights are not absolute.”).
123. Casey, 505 U.S. at 875 (emphasis added) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
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intrusion is of necessity unwarranted.”124 As the Court observes,
“Roe did not declare an unqualified constitutional right to an
abortion . . . . Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to
terminate her pregnancy.”125 Indeed, the very name of Casey’s
test—the “undue” burden test—suggests that the state has the
opportunity to explain why its restrictions are “due” or
“warranted.”
c. A State’s Compelling Interest in Eliminating Sex
Discrimination May Allow a Sex-Selection Abortion Ban to
Survive the Undue Burden Test
Though there are a number of reasons for concluding that
additional state interests are relevant to the undue burden test,
the Court’s summary dismissal of the challenge to the parental
consent requirement in Casey126 leaves one to wonder how the
additional interests supporting a narrow sex-selection abortion
would be weighed under the test. The answer may come from an
unlikely place—the Court’s opinions with respect to the
constitutionally protected freedom to associate for expressive
purposes and, specifically, the opinions in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees,127 Board of Directors of Rotary International v.
Rotary Club of Duarte,128 and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.129 In
those cases, the Court considered whether public accommodation
statutes—those that prohibit discrimination based on, among
other attributes, race, religion, sex, and, in the case of the statute
as issue in Dale, sexual orientation—unconstitutionally infringed
on a group’s associational rights.130 The Court in all of the cases
124. Id.
125. Id. at 874–75 (emphasis added) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
473–74 (1977)).
126. See id. at 899 (disposing of the challenge to the parental consent
provisions in two paragraphs and with almost no analysis).
127. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
128. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
129. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
130. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 644, 645–47 (explaining that the plaintiff filed
suit, alleging the Boy Scouts violated New Jersey’s public accommodation
statute by revoking his membership because he was homosexual and that the
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abandoned strict scrutiny in favor of an undue burden-like
balancing test131 and, in two, determined that the state’s interest
in eliminating sex discrimination tipped the balance in favor of
the statute.132
In Roberts, the Court determined that a Minnesota public
accommodation statute did not violate the constitutional rights of
the United States Jaycees by requiring the group to admit women
as full voting members.133 Just as it had in Roe with respect to a
woman’s constitutional right to choose abortion, the Court in
Roberts indicated that “[t]he right to associate for expressive
purposes is not . . . absolute.”134 Accordingly, the Court stated,
“[i]nfringements on that right may be justified by regulations
Court granted certiorari to decide whether the law violated the First
Amendment); Duarte, 481 U.S. at 539 (stating the question to be decided was
“whether a California [public accommodation] statute that requires California
Rotary Clubs to admit women members violates the First Amendment”);
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612, 615 (introducing the plaintiff’s argument that the
public accommodation statute infringed on male Jaycees members’ rights of free
speech and expressive association).
131. See Dale, 539 U.S. at 640–41 (describing the balancing test needed to
weigh the potential burden on the Boy Scouts’ freedom of expressive association
against the state’s interest in combating discrimination against a segment of
society); Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549 (stating the law does not infringe on Rotary
members’ expressive freedoms and that any infringement would be justified
because it serves a compelling state interest); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626 (finding
that the plaintiffs had “failed to demonstrate that the Act impose[d] any serious
burdens” on their associational rights).
132. See Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549
In Roberts we recognized that the State’s compelling interest in
assuring equal access to women extends to the acquisition of
leadership skills and business contacts as well as tangible goods and
services. Id., at 626, 104 S.Ct., at 3254. The Unruh Act plainly serves
this interest. We therefore hold that application of the Unruh Act to
California Rotary Clubs does not violate the right of expressive
association afforded by the First Amendment.
(citations omitted); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628 (“[Absent] a showing far more
substantial than that attempted by the Jaycees, we decline to indulge in the
sexual stereotyping that underlies appellee’s contention that, by allowing
women to vote, application of the Minnesota Act will change the content or
impact of the organization’s speech.”).
133. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612, 627 (1984) (holding that
there is “no basis . . . for concluding that admission of women as full voting
members will impede the organization’s ability to engage in . . . protected
activities or to disseminate its preferred views” because the Act requires no
change in stating or promoting the group’s beliefs).
134. Id. at 623.
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adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”135
Upholding the Minnesota statute, the Court in Roberts
observed that a state has a compelling interest “of the highest
order” in “eradicating” discrimination against women, 136 that the
statute was not designed to suppress speech, but aimed at
“eliminating discrimination and assuring citizens equal access to
publicly available goods and services,”137 and that the statute did
not impose “any serious burdens on the male members’ freedom
of expressive association.”138 As to the relative burden, the Court
noted that the Jaycees already allowed women to participate as
nonvoting members and that admitting women as full members
did not affect policy positions the Jaycees had taken over the
years.139 According to the Court, the statute “impose[d] no
restrictions on the organization’s ability to exclude individuals
with ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing
members, [and] even if enforcement of the Act cause[d] some
incidental abridgment of the Jaycees’ protected speech, that effect
is no greater than is necessary to accomplish the State’s
legitimate purposes.”140
The Court in Duarte reached a similar conclusion with
respect to a California public accommodation statute’s burden on
the associational rights of Rotary International, whose
constitution limited Rotary Club membership to men.141 In
finding in favor of the state, the Court in Duarte considered most
of the same factors that it had in Roberts.142 As to the extent of
the burden on their freedom of expressive association, the Court
135. Id. at 623–24.
136. Id. at 623.
137. Id. at 623–24.
138. Id. at 626.
139. Id. at 626–27.
140. Id. at 627–28.
141. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537,
549 (1987) (analogizing the holding in this case to the holding in Roberts).
142. Compare Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627–29 (1984)
(considering the state’s purpose, the means chosen, the necessity of the means to
achieve the purpose, and the burden on the organization), with Duarte, 481 U.S.
at 548–49 (considering the state’s interest in eliminating discrimination against
women and incidental or other burdens on the club).
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noted that Rotary Clubs had a practice of not engaging in “public
questions” and that the California statute did not preclude or
limit the ability of the clubs to pursue “their basic goals of
humanitarian service, high ethical standards in all vocations,
good will, and peace.”143 In addition, just as it had in Roberts, the
Court indicated that, “[e]ven if the [California statute did] work
some slight infringement on Rotary members’ right of expressive
association, that infringement [was] justified because it serves
the State’s compelling interest in eliminating discrimination
against women.”144 Unlike in Roberts, however, the Court in
Duarte did not evaluate whether the effect of the “slight
infringement” was greater than necessary to serve the state’s
purposes in eradicating sex discrimination. Instead, the Court in
Duarte seemed to find that a public accommodation statute
prohibiting sex discrimination, by its very nature, imposes no
infringement that is greater than is necessary. Said another way,
if a public accommodation statute’s infringement on a party’s
expressive associational rights is only slight, the state’s interest
in eradicating sex discrimination always tips the balance in favor
of the statute.
The issue in Dale was whether a New Jersey public
accommodation statute that prohibited discrimination based on
sexual orientation unconstitutionally infringed upon the freedom
of expressive association enjoyed by the Boy Scouts of America,
which had revoked the adult membership of homosexual activist
James Dale.145 Finding in favor of the Boy Scouts,146 the Court
noted the balancing test it had applied in Roberts and Duarte:
[A]fter finding a compelling state interest, the Court [in
Roberts and Duarte] went on to examine whether or not the
application of the state law would impose any “serious burden”
on the organization’s rights of expressive association. So in
these cases, the associational interest in freedom of expression
has been set on one side of the scale, and the State’s interest
on the other.147
143. Duarte, 481 U.S. at 548.
144. Roberts, 481 U.S. at 549.
145. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644–45 (2000).
146. See id. at 644 (holding New Jersey’s public accommodation law violated
the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right to expressive association).
147. Id. at 658–59.
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The Court in Dale then purported to apply the balancing test,
though it did so without explaining why the scale tipped in favor
of the Boy Scouts. Largely deferring to the assessment made by
the Boy Scouts as to the burden involved, the Court merely
concluded that requiring the Boy Scouts to include Dale imposed
a significant burden on the organization’s freedom of association
for expressive purposes and that “[t]he state interests embodied
in New Jersey’s public accommodation law [did] not justify such a
severe intrusion.”148
The most cautious reading of Dale, and perhaps the best, is
that an infringement on a group’s freedom of association for
expressive purposes only is constitutional if the infringement is
slight and advances a compelling government interest. According
to the Court,
We recognized in cases such as Roberts and Duarte that States
have a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination
against women in public accommodations. But in each of these
cases we went on to conclude that the enforcement of these
statutes would not materially interfere with the ideas that the
organization sought to express.149

Moreover, the Court in Dale indicated that its analysis was
similar to that in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston,150 a case in which the Court had
applied its “traditional First Amendment analysis”151 and found
that a public accommodation law preventing discrimination based
on sexual orientation violated the First Amendment free speech
rights of private parade organizers who did not wish to have a
homosexual group march in their parade.152 In reaching this
decision, the Court observed that no legitimate interest had been
identified to support the statute, but that, if the state was trying
to “produce a society free of . . . biases,” applying the statute to
148. Id. at 653, 659.
149. Id. at 657.
150. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
151. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 566; see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640, 659 (2000) (stating its First Amendment analysis was similar to that in
Hurley).
152. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561, 566 (1995) (holding the law requiring
parade organizers to admit groups expressing messaging inconsistent with the
organizers’ views to be an unconstitutional violation of free speech).
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the parade organizers would strike at the very heart of their free
speech rights because “[o]ur tradition of free speech commands
that a speaker who takes to the street corner to express his views
in this way should be free from interference by the State based on
the content of what he says.”153 In other words, if the object of the
public accommodation statute in Hurley was to control the
content of a person’s speech, its impact would be severe and
impermissible. Similarly, the Court in Dale found that the New
Jersey law “directly and immediately affect[ed] associational
rights . . . that enjoy First Amendment protection.”154 The
severity of the impact, therefore, seems to have been critical to
the Court’s decision in Dale, leaving one to conclude that Roberts,
Duarte, and Dale only permit infringement on expressive
associational rights when the infringement is slight and the state
has a compelling interest “unrelated to the suppression of
ideas.”155
The nature of a woman’s right to choose abortion and the
nature of the right to freedom of expressive association are
surprisingly similar. Roe recognized that, because of the presence
of a potential life, the right to privacy associated with a woman’s
right to choose is “inherently different [from the right to privacy
as it relates to] marital intimacy, or bedroom possession of
obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education.”156
Likewise, the Court in Duarte and Roberts recognized that the
relationships among the members of the Jaycees and Rotary
Clubs were unlike the intimate relationships involved in
marriage, procreation, and family relationships, which warranted
more robust associational protection.157 Thus, one might
reasonably argue that, just as a state’s compelling interest in
eradicating sex discrimination justifies a slight infringement on
expressive associational rights, the same compelling interest—
153. Id. at 578–79.
154. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
155. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
156. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
157. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537,
545–47 (1987) (distinguishing the relationship among Rotary Club members
from the relationships that have enjoyed greater associational protection);
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620–21 (distinguishing the relationships involved in the
Jaycees from more “intimate relationships”).

1124

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089 (2014)

one “of the highest order”158—justifies a sex-selection abortion
ban that imposes only a slight infringement on a woman’s right to
choose.
Moreover, interests like those present in Gonzales, a case in
which the Court employed the undue burden standard,159 apply
equally to sex-selection abortion bans. In Gonzales, the Court
noted that, in adopting the federal partial-birth abortion ban,
Congress was concerned that allowing partial-birth abortion
would “coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but
all vulnerable and innocent human life, making it increasingly
difficult to protect such life.”160 Permitting sex-selection abortion
similarly could “coarsen society” to the equal dignity of women
and men and could impede the progress society has made in that
regard.161 As the American Society of Reproductive Medicine
(ASRM) asserted in discussing pre-implantation genetic diagnosis
(PGD), if individual or family desires with respect to the sex of
offspring are:
fulfilled on a large scale through PGD for sex selection, they
may contribute to a society’s gender stereotyping and overall
gender discrimination. On the other hand, if they are
expressed and fulfilled only on a small scale and sporadically
(as is presently the case), their social implications will be
correspondingly limited. Still, they remain vulnerable to the
judgment that no matter what their basis, they identify gender
as a reason to value one person over another, and they support
socially constructed stereotypes of what gender means. In
doing so, they not only reinforce possibilities of unfair
discrimination, but they may trivialize human reproduction by

158. Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549 (quoting Roberts); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
159. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2008) (upholding the
challenged law because it did not impose an undue burden).
160. See id. at 157 (quoting congressional findings on the effects of allowing
partial-birth abortions).
161. Legislative findings included in several bills proposing sex-selection
bans indicate that the bans are justified as a measure to protect against
“coarsening society.” Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2013, H.R.
447, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(3)(B) (2013); H.B. 13-1131, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. § 1 (Colo. 2013); S.B. 13-056, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 1 (Colo.
2013); H.B. 845, 2013 Leg., Leg. Sess. 2013 (Fla. 2013); S.B. 1072, 2013 Leg.,
Leg. Sess. 2013 (Fla. 2013); A. 2157, 215th Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. § 1(p) (N.J. 2013).
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making it depend on the selection of nonessential features of
offspring.162

In addition, the Court noted in Gonzales that it “has in the past
confirmed the validity of drawing boundaries to prevent certain
practices that extinguish life and are close to actions that are
condemned.”163 Because sex-selection abortion bears a striking
similarity to the historical practice of female infanticide in
societies that have valued boys over girls,164 banning the
procedure sets a necessary and appropriate boundary.
A state that adopts a sex-selection abortion ban also has a
strong argument that it is “protecting the integrity and ethics of
the medical profession,”165 an interest the Court in Gonzales
found important. In upholding the federal partial-birth abortion
ban, the Court observed that “Congress was concerned . . . with
the effects on the medical community and on its reputation
caused by the practice of partial-birth abortion.”166 The same
ethical issues exist with respect to sex-selection abortion. In fact,
the case for a narrow sex-selection abortion ban might be more
compelling than that for the federal partial birth abortion ban
because the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
(ACOG), which vehemently opposed the partial-birth abortion
ban,167 generally considers performing an abortion based on the
sex of the fetus to be unethical:
162. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Sex Selection and Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis, 72 FERTILITY & STERILITY 595, 597 (1999), http://www.asrm.org/
uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/Ethics_Committee_Repo
rts_and_Statements/Sex_Selection.pdf.
163. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2008).
164. See E.G. Austin, Looking Out for Baby Girls, ECONOMIST (June 28,
2011, 4:42 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/
06/sex-selective-abortion (last visited Feb. 6, 2014) (noting that “widespread
access to abortion . . . is not the only cause of . . . gendercide—many baby girls
are simply killed”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jason C.
Greaves, Sex-Selective Abortion in the U.S.: Does Roe v. Wade Protect Arbitrary
Gender Discrimination?, 24 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 333, 335 (2013)
(“Before the widespread availability of prenatal screening, [son preference] was
accomplished through infanticide . . . .”).
165. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702 (1997)).
166. Id.
167. See ACOG Statement on the U.S. Supreme Court Decision Upholding
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS &
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The committee accepts, as ethically permissible, the practice of
sex selection to prevent sex-linked genetic disorders. The
committee opposes meeting other requests for sex selection,
such as the belief that offspring of a certain sex are inherently
more valuable. The committee opposes meeting requests for
sex selection for personal and family reasons, including family
balancing, because of the concern that such requests may
ultimately support sexist practices.168

In addition, though not favoring legal prohibition of sex-selection
through PGD, ASRM states that “the cumulative weight of the
arguments against nonmedically motivated sex-selection gives
cause for serious ethical caution.”169
Moreover, a sex-selection abortion ban arguably advances a
state’s interest in the safety and well-being of its citizens. Bills
both in Congress and in the Colorado and New Jersey
legislatures assert that
[s]ex selection abortion results in an unnatural sex ratio
imbalance, which is undesirable due to the inability of the
numerically predominant sex to find mates; and such
imbalance gives rise to the commoditization of humans, in the
form of human trafficking and a consequent increase in
kidnapping and other violent crimes.170

These claims are not unfounded. Mara Hvistendahl postulates in
a 2011 book that similar effects have occurred in China because
of a skewed sex-ratio that resulted from the abortion of female
fetuses just because they are female.171 These effects have not
GYNECOLOGISTS
(Apr.
18,
2007),
http://www.acog.org/About_ACOG/
News_Room/News_Releases/2007/ACOG_Statement_on_the_US_Supreme_Cour
t_Decision (last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (quoting the ACOG president as saying
“[t]oday’s decision to uphold the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 is
shameful and incomprehensible to those of us who have dedicated our lives to
caring for women”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
168. Sex Selection, COMM. OPINION NO. 360 (Comm. on Ethics), Feb. 2007,
reaffirmed 2011, at 4, http://www.acog.org/~/media/Committee%20Opinions/
Committee%20on%20Ethics/co360.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20140207T1106472847.
169. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 162, at 598.
170. H.R. 447, 113th Cong. § 2N (2013); see also H.B. 13-1131, 69th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 2(a)(XII) (Colo. 2013); A. 2157, 215th Leg., 2d Ann.
Sess. (N.J. 2013).
171. See MARA HVISTENDAHL, UNNATURAL SELECTION: CHOOSING BOYS OVER
GIRLS, AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF A WORLD FULL OF MEN 217–25 (2011)
(describing the consequences of an imbalanced sex ratio); Jonathan V. Last, The
War Against Girls, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/
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been seen in the United States on a large scale, but there is
reason to be concerned about them. Researchers have found that,
in particular communities, after having a girl, the sex ratio for
some children becomes unnaturally high.172 As more and more
Americans try to design the “perfect family,”173 the risks
associated with sex selection could become more real.
Despite the state’s compelling interest in eliminating sex
discrimination and the other substantial interests that support
sex-selection abortion bans, if Casey’s undue burden test applies
in the same way as the Court seems to have applied the
balancing test in its freedom of expressive association cases, a
sex-selection abortion ban will survive only if it infringes on a
woman’s right to choose no more than slightly.174 Reaching such a
article/SB10001424052702303657404576361691165631366.html (last visited
Feb. 7, 2014) (reviewing Hvistendahl’s book) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
172. See Sujatha Jesudason & Anat Shenker-Osorio, Sex Selection in
America: Why It Persists and How We Can Change It, ATLANTIC (May 21, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/05/sex-selection-in-americawhy-it-persists-and-how-we-can-change-it/257864/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2014)
(noting that a normal sex ratio is between 1.02 and 1.06 boys per girl and that,
in “Korean, Chinese, and Indian communities . . . after having one girl, parents
have as many as 1.17 boys per girl,” and after having two girls, “the ratio goes
up to 1.51”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
173. See id. (noting that fertility clinics advertise services to facilitate
“family balancing”). A number of companies now provide services to facilitate
sex selection. See, e.g., GENDER SELECT, LLC, http://chooseagender.com/
Default.aspx?gclid=CKTevcqMjrYCFcWPPAodQVIAnw (last visited Mar. 16,
2014) (offering its services to help people “bring[] the number of children of each
gender in one family closer to equal”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). These companies may not provide sex-selection abortion services, but
their existence indicates a demand for sex selection. It is not hard to imagine a
case in which a couple chooses a sex-selection abortion after their preconception
efforts fail.
174. The Dale opinion, however, could be interpreted as allowing a greater
infringement. In Dale, the Court did not describe the state interests supporting
the New Jersey publication accommodation statute at issue in the case or assess
the weight of those interests, but only decided that the interests were
insufficient to justify a substantial infringement on the associational rights of
the Boy Scouts. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 540 U.S. 640, 659 (2000). Early in its
opinion, the Court noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court had found that the
state’s “compelling interest in eliminating the destructive consequences of
discrimination from society” justified the New Jersey public accommodation law,
but the Dale opinion nowhere identifies this broad interest as compelling. Id. at
640. Moreover, the Dale Court indicated that its analysis was similar to that in
Hurley, and in Hurley, the Court noted that no legitimate interest had been
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conclusion is difficult at best because an abortion ban of any type
would appear to strike at the very heart of the abortion right.
Yet, a close look at the foundations of a woman’s right to choose
abortion reveals its essence, which a narrow sex-selection
abortion ban does not “directly” or “immediately”175 affect.
When it recognized a woman’s right to abort a nonviable
fetus, the Court in Roe was driven by a number of detriments
associated with pregnancy and parenthood:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific
and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early
pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring,
may force upon the woman a distressful life and future.
Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical
health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress,
for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and
there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already
unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other
cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing
stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.176

The Court in Casey drew on Roe’s concerns when it described a
concept of liberty that includes a woman’s right to choose.177
According to Casey, the Court’s previous decisions regarding
contraception
support the reasoning in Roe relating to the woman’s liberty
because they involve personal decisions concerning not only
the meaning of procreation, but also human responsibility and
respect for it. . . . One view is based on such reverence for the
identified to support the infringement of the speech rights of parade organizers
imposed by a Massachusetts public accommodation law that barred
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Id. at 659; Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 578 (1995). One might argue
then that the Court in Dale found no compelling interest in preventing
discrimination based on sexual orientation and therefore left open the
possibility that a significant infringement (though perhaps not one that is
severe) might be constitutional when justified by a compelling interest.
175. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
176. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
177. Justin Gillette, Comment, Pregnant and Prejudiced: The
Constitutionality of Sex- and Race-Selective Abortion Restrictions, 88 WASH. L.
REV. 645, 664 (2013) (noting that, since Roe, the Court often has referred to
“women’s reproductive rights in terms of liberty interests rather than the right
to privacy”).
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wonder of creation that any pregnancy ought to be welcomed
and carried to full term no matter how difficult it will be to
provide for the child and ensure its well-being. Another is that
the inability to provide for the nurture and care of the infant is
a cruelty to the child and an anguish to the parent. . . . [These]
concerns are present when the woman confronts the reality
that, perhaps despite her attempts to avoid it, she has become
pregnant. It was this dimension of personal liberty that Roe
sought to protect.178

The detriments described in Roe and the confines of the liberty
interest explained in Casey arguably form the core of a woman’s
right to choose. 179
A narrow ban on sex-selection abortion does not implicate
any of these concerns in a meaningful way. A woman who chooses
to have an abortion based solely on the sex of the fetus is not
concerned with her health, the burdens of maternity, additional
offspring or child care, the distress in having a child, the inability
to care for a child, or the stigma of unwed motherhood. Nor can
one genuinely claim that a narrow sex-selection abortion ban
inhibits a woman’s liberty “to define [her] own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life.”180 The sex of a child alone has little, if any, bearing
on any of these things. Therefore, any infringement that a narrow
sex-selection ban might impose on a woman’s right to choose
reasonably can be characterized as slight or insubstantial and, in
light of the state’s compelling interest in eliminating sex
discrimination and the other important interests described above,
justified.

178. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992).
179. Gillette, supra note 177, at 666 (“The Roe Court reasoned that the
fundamental nature of [the abortion] right stemmed in part from the drastic
consequences that may flow from the inability to exercise the right: forcing a
woman to keep an unwanted pregnancy can take a serious toll on . . . her
physical and psychological health.”).
180. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
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V. The Future of Sex-Selection Abortion Bans

As should now be clear, the case for the constitutionality previability of the most narrow sex-selection abortion ban is a
difficult one. Not surprisingly, broader bans are harder to justify.
Even post-viability, a broader ban may run afoul of Casey. As
discussed above, bans that prohibit an abortion sought solely
based on the sex of the fetus do not need life or health exceptions
because an abortion that is necessary to protect the life or health
of the woman is not based solely on the sex of the fetus.181 A
broader ban that proscribes abortions when sought based on (but
not solely based on) the sex of the fetus, on the other hand, raises
questions about how a woman who has other reasons for choosing
abortion might be affected. If the sex of the fetus is one among
other reasons, does the ban apply? If so, it almost certainly is
unconstitutional post-viability—because it does not allow for
abortion when a woman’s life or health is at risk—and previability—because it would preclude a woman from choosing an
abortion when she has any other permissible reason.
Of course, bans that merely fail to use the word “solely” are
susceptible to a narrow interpretation. North Carolina’s broadly
written ban, however, is not. It clearly captures cases in which
sex selection is one among other reasons and contains neither a
life nor a health exception.182 As a result, North Carolina’s ban
very likely is unconstitutional both pre- and post-viability. 183
181. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (considering the
constitutionality post-viability of narrow sex-selection abortion bans).
182. S.B. 353, Gen. Assemb., 2013-14 Reg. Sess. § 3(a) (N.C. 2013) (emphasis
added).
183. See S.B. 353, Gen. Assemb., 2013-14 Reg. Sess. § 3(a) (N.C. 2013)
(banning abortion when “a significant factor . . . is related to the sex of the
[fetus].” (emphasis added)). In fact, the language used in North Carolina’s ban is
reminiscent of language that proved problematic in the Supreme Court’s
consideration in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), of Nebraska’s partial
birth abortion ban. In Stenberg, the Court determined that the statute posed an
undue burden because it could be interpreted to encompass a [dilation and
extraction procedure (“D&E”)], which is commonly used. See Stenberg, 530 U.S.
at 939, 945–46 (describing the overbreadth of Nebraska’s partial-birth abortion
ban and finding an undue burden). The statute that the Court found
problematic “forb[ade] ‘deliberately and intentionally delivering into the vagina
a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the purpose of
performing a procedure that the person performing such procedure knows will
kill the unborn child.’” Id. at 938 (emphasis added). The Court in Gonzales, in
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The sex-selection abortion bans that have been enacted or
proposed tend to have a uniform scope throughout pregnancy and
therefore fail to account for the different standards that apply to
pre-viability and post-viability measures under Casey.184 As a
result, the narrowest bans sacrifice strength post-viability in
favor of maximizing the likelihood of surviving constitutional
scrutiny pre-viability. Broader bans, in contrast, find themselves
on very shaky ground pre-viability, but attempt to take better
advantage of the more robust power states have with respect to
post-viability measures.
States could achieve better balance by drafting their statutes
to reflect more closely the differing standards that apply pre- and
post-viability under Casey. Pre-viability, a state should do no
more than prohibit abortions sought solely for sex-selection. As
indicated above, even such a narrow sex-selection abortion ban
faces significant challenges pre-viability, and leaving any
ambiguity as to a ban’s breadth only increases the chances of its
being found unconstitutional.185 Post-viability, a state might use
language similar to that in the North Carolina ban—prohibiting a
person from performing an abortion when he or she has
“knowledge, or an objective reason to know, that a significant
factor in the woman seeking the abortion is related to the sex of
the [fetus]”186—but with specific life and health exceptions. In
addition, a state should be sure to include specific severability
provisions so that a ban can survive post-viability even if struck
down pre-viability.187 By taking these simple steps, a state can
upholding the federal partial-birth abortion ban, found the omission of the
language covering delivery of a “substantial portion” of an unborn child to be
significant. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 152 (“The Act . . . thus
displaces the interpretation of ‘delivering’ dictated by the Nebraska statute’s
reference to a ‘substantial portion’ of the fetus.”).
184. See supra notes 16–24 and accompanying text (discussing proposed and
passed legislation).
185. See supra notes 54–55 (discussing the uphill battle a pre-viability ban
faces).
186. S.B. 353, Gen. Assemb., 2013–14 Reg. Sess. § 3(a) (N.C. 2013).
187. Only the Illinois law and the bills proposed in Indiana, Missouri, and
Virginia include severability clauses. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 510/6(8) (1985);
H.B. 1430, 118th Gen. Assemb., 2013 Leg. Sess. § 4(a)–(b) (Ind. 2013); S.B. 183,
118th Gen. Assemb., 2013 Leg. Sess. § 4(c) (Ind. 2013); H.B. 386, 97th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 188.281(2) (Mo. 2013); H.B. 1316, Gen. Assemb., 2013
Sess. § 18.2-71.2(D) (Va. 2012).
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maximize the effect of a ban, while improving its chances of
withstanding a constitutional challenge.
Regardless of whether a sex-selection abortion ban applies or
is constitutional pre-viability, states should strengthen their bans
by requiring that a woman be given a disclosure regarding the
ban before she has an abortion. In Casey, the Court indicated that
“a State [may] further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of
the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision
that is mature and informed, even when in so doing the State
expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion,”188 and that a
state law requiring a woman to be given information that is
“truthful and not misleading” does not impose an undue
burden.189 Consequently, a state might seek to curb sex-selection
abortion by requiring a disclosure such as the following:
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
considers performing an abortion based on the sex of the fetus
to be unethical, except when aimed at preventing sex-linked
genetic disorders. The State of __________ likewise considers
choosing to have an abortion based [solely] on the sex of the
unborn child to be unethical, and performing a sex-selection
abortion [after an unborn child has reached the point at which
he or she can live outside the womb] is prohibited by
_____________ law.190

A state speaks strongly when it adopts a sex-selection abortion
ban, but it needs to make sure that its message is heard. Only the
legislation proposed in Virginia requires disclosure of the ban to a
woman seeking to have an abortion.191 Other states would benefit
from doing the same.

188. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992).
189. Id. at 882.
190. A state might even be able to require a physician to make this
statement orally before a woman has an abortion without violating the
physician’s First Amendment right to be free from being compelled to speak. See
Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Casey and a Woman’s Right to Know:
Ultrasounds, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 45 CONN. L. REV.
595, 597–601, 646 (2012) (concluding that compelling physicians to display
ultrasound images to a woman seeking an abortion and to explain those images
does not violate the physician’s First Amendment right to be free from
compelled speech).
191. H.B. 1316, Gen. Assemb., 2013 Sess. § 18.2-76(A)-(C) (Va.).
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Finally, states would do well to include sex-selection abortion
bans within broader legislation aimed at eliminating sex
discrimination against potential life. One report indicates that,
“as of 2006, half of American fertility clinics that offer embryo
screening allow would-be parents some form or sex-selective addons . . . and the market is growing.”192 Legislators who are
concerned about potential life inside the womb should be equally
concerned with practices such as these that affect potential life
outside the womb, and by adopting bans on sex selection that
extend beyond sex-selection abortions, legislators can avoid a
charge that they are singling out abortion and acquiescing to an
activity that has the similar effect.
VI. Conclusion
In light of all of the potential pitfalls associated with sexselection abortion bans, one reasonably might ask whether the
bans are worthwhile. After all, any abortion restriction that a
state adopts must allow the procedure when it is necessary to
preserve a woman’s health,193 and as Clarke Forsythe points out
in a recent book, the broad definition the Court in Doe v. Bolton194
gave to the “‘health’ exception . . . swallowed the supposed ability
of the states to prohibit abortion.”195 Moreover, a woman seeking
an abortion based on the sex of the fetus need not tell anyone of
her reason. Justice Ginsberg might say then, as she did in
192. Jesudason & Shenker-Osorio, supra note 172; see also Annie
Moskovian, Bans on Sex-Selective Abortions: How Far Is Too Far?, 40 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 423, 444–45 (2013) (indicating that some couples use PGD “through
in vitro fertilization . . . for sex selection”).
193. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161 (2007) (considering in
applying the undue burden test whether the federal partial birth abortion ban
“creates significant health risks for women”); Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (noting
that, after viability, any prohibition on abortion must permit the procedure
“where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of
the life or health of the mother” (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165
(1973))).
194. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
195. CLARKE D. FORSYTHE, ABUSE OF DISCRETION 8 (2013); see also Doe, 410
U.S. at 192 (“[M]edical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors—
physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to
the well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health.”).
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Gonzales, that a sex-selection abortion ban “saves not a single
fetus from destruction.”196
Yet, sex-selection abortion bans matter. The very act of
banning sex-selection abortions may discourage a woman from
seeking such an abortion,197 and by enacting a ban, a state
expresses its view about potential life and the equal dignity of
women and men. As suggested by Roberts and Duarte, a state has
a compelling interest in delivering this message,198 and a state
speaks with particular strength when it adopts a ban. A sexselection abortion ban that applies after a fetus becomes viable
can deliver this message and certainly is more easily defensible
under Casey, but only a ban that applies throughout pregnancy
can affirm that women and men always share equal dignity.
Nevertheless, as this Article demonstrates, it is difficult to
argue that a pre-viability ban of any type is constitutional under
Casey. With that in mind, states need to be realistic about what
they can achieve through their sex-selection abortion bans and
must be smart about how they draft them. Wise lawmakers will
adopt bans that, pre-viability, are as narrow as those enacted in
Kansas, Illinois, North Dakota, and Oklahoma and, post-viability,
are as broad as the ban adopted in North Carolina, but with life
and health exceptions. If states do otherwise, their efforts may be
for naught and their simple but important message could be lost.

196. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 160 (majority opinion) (“It is a reasonable inference that a
necessary effect of the regulation and the knowledge it conveys will be to
encourage some women to carry the infant to full term, thus reducing the
absolute number of late-term abortions.”).
198. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing recognition by
the Court in Roberts and Duarte that a state has a compelling interest in
eliminating sex discrimination).

